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@@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ static void wpa_rekey_gmk(void *eloop_ctx, void *timeout_ctx)
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"initialization.");
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} else {
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wpa_auth_logger(wpa_auth, NULL, LOGGER_DEBUG, "GMK rekeyd");
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK",
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+ wpa_auth->group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
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}
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if (wpa_auth->conf.wpa_gmk_rekey) {
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@@ -325,9 +327,12 @@ static struct wpa_group * wpa_group_init(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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os_free(group);
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return NULL;
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}
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", group->GMK, WPA_GMK_LEN);
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sha1_prf(rkey, sizeof(rkey), "Init Counter", buf, sizeof(buf),
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group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "Key Counter",
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+ group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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group->GInit = TRUE;
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wpa_group_sm_step(wpa_auth, group);
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@@ -995,25 +1000,31 @@ void wpa_receive(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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}
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-static void wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const u8 *addr, const u8 *gnonce,
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- u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
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+static void wpa_gmk_to_gtk(const u8 *gmk, const char *label, const u8 *addr,
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+ const u8 *gnonce, u8 *gtk, size_t gtk_len)
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{
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- u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN];
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+ u8 data[ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN + 8 + 16];
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+ u8 *pos;
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- /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion", AA || GNonce) */
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+ /* GTK = PRF-X(GMK, "Group key expansion",
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+ * AA || GNonce || Time || random data)
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+ * The example described in the IEEE 802.11 standard uses only AA and
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+ * GNonce as inputs here. Add some more entropy since this derivation
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+ * is done only at the Authenticator and as such, does not need to be
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+ * exactly same.
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+ */
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os_memcpy(data, addr, ETH_ALEN);
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os_memcpy(data + ETH_ALEN, gnonce, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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+ pos = data + ETH_ALEN + WPA_NONCE_LEN;
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+ wpa_get_ntp_timestamp(pos);
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+ pos += 8;
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+ os_get_random(pos, 16);
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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- sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, "Group key expansion",
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- data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
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+ sha256_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
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#else /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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- sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, "Group key expansion",
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- data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
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+ sha1_prf(gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN, label, data, sizeof(data), gtk, gtk_len);
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#endif /* CONFIG_IEEE80211W */
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-
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- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GMK", gmk, WPA_GMK_LEN);
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- wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK", gtk, gtk_len);
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}
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@@ -2094,20 +2105,22 @@ static int wpa_gtk_update(struct wpa_authenticator *wpa_auth,
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{
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int ret = 0;
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- /* FIX: is this the correct way of getting GNonce? */
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os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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- wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
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+ wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "Group key expansion",
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+ wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
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group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
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+ wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "GTK",
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+ group->GTK[group->GN - 1], group->GTK_len);
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#ifdef CONFIG_IEEE80211W
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if (wpa_auth->conf.ieee80211w != NO_MGMT_FRAME_PROTECTION) {
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- if (os_get_random(group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
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- WPA_IGTK_LEN) < 0) {
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- wpa_printf(MSG_INFO, "RSN: Failed to get new random "
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- "IGTK");
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- ret = -1;
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- }
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+ os_memcpy(group->GNonce, group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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+ inc_byte_array(group->Counter, WPA_NONCE_LEN);
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+ wpa_gmk_to_gtk(group->GMK, "IGTK key expansion",
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+ wpa_auth->addr, group->GNonce,
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+ group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4],
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+ WPA_IGTK_LEN);
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wpa_hexdump_key(MSG_DEBUG, "IGTK",
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group->IGTK[group->GN_igtk - 4], WPA_IGTK_LEN);
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}
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